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Social Studies - Public and Private

Note: This article comes from the pen of a private school graduate who taught history in two private schools for a period of five years, but who changed his allegiance a year and a half ago to enter public school work. The contrasts and comparisons which are made here are necessarily based on personal experience, since the writer claims no broad general knowledge of the practices in either private or public schools. Undoubtedly there are persons with different experiences in different types of schools who will take strong exception to what follows, on the same grounds of personal experience. The writer wishes them strength for their convictions, and would be glad to hear from them either personally or through the columns of this publication. All references to schools in these remarks concern the secondary level.

To say that the social studies work in a private school will reflect the peculiarities of that school is certainly not a startling statement. I shall push this idea a little further and say that private schools as a group have certain characteristics which are, in turn, reflected in the approach made to social studies within them. I am perfectly well aware that private schools are as varied as individuals, and, therefore, I shall exclude the numerous highly specialized institutions and consider only the large group of schools which regard themselves as having two major functions: (1) preparation for advanced intellectual endeavor, and (2) the development of qualities of character and personality through careful guidance in a favorable atmosphere. Into a group broadly described in this fashion will fall the majority of our better known private schools. Those mainly interested in providing a terminal education and those dealing in special problems of all kinds are outside the present frame of thought.

Of the private schools of which I am speaking some generalizations can be made. They are, with a few notable exceptions, conservative in their approach to education. They place a great deal of emphasis on intellectual achievement, and many insist on an extremely high standard of performance in academic subjects. They are, in general, populated by a breed of student of superior ability and potentiality, compared to the normal run of the population. Their teachers are amateurs in the sense that public school teachers are professionals—that is, the private school teacher has rarely studied teaching as a pro-

fession or considered the problem of education in the abstract; and he would be the first to defend his amateur standing when it is so defined, since he is highly suspicious of schools of education. Private schools, as a group, because of their specialized nature, take little or no interest in the activities of public schools. They necessarily cater to the upper income brackets, though the generous scholarship programs at some private schools give at least a partial cross section in economic and social background to the student body. They are heavily influenced by tradition, partly because they depend for financial support on their graduates. Many of them have attracted as teachers and administrators men and women of extraordinary force, vision, and ability; and, because of this, these schools leave an unusually strong imprint on the lives of those who attend them.

This brief characterization leaves out many elements that come to mind, but it will serve for our purposes. Because of these characteristics the general run of private schools has a certain type of social studies program which, in spite of variations in detail, will be found to run true to form through most such schools. It is a program which is still strongly influenced by the old College Boards before the change to the modern type of objective testing. Textbooks used, course content, and teaching methods in many private schools still bear the imprint of this influence.

The private school history teacher is not suspicious of testing methods which are highly subjective. In fact, he is often certain that there is much to be gained from these methods when they are well handled. The courses he teaches delve deeply into factual material and demand some sound scholarship in terms of working with original source material, as well as in using a true historical method. He teaches current events as matters of interest and importance, yet his main emphasis remains on the past, which he attempts to see with his students in its own light and not through an overdose of analogies with the present.

Because most private schools are somewhat isolated from the daily life of the immediate communities within which they exist, they tend in their social studies work to ignore the study of social forces and individual problems at the community level. In American History, for instance, it is typical of a private secondary school to do an advanced and thorough job in the analysis of the growth and development of our Federal Constitution and the national government, but to leave relatively untouched the entire field of state and local government. This stems partly from the fact that private schools regard themselves as preparing for further education. They do not feel the

immediate responsibility for providing the last formal learning which their students will have. They are able to pass lightly over the field of local self-government and its problems because they do not feel that theirs is the ultimate responsibility for education for citizenship. Private schools could well do some self-examination along this line. It is at the community level that most people are going to develop political interests and become politically effective, and as far as I know there is little pressure to include such studies in the required programs of the colleges which private school graduates will eventually attend.

Much of the social studies work in private schools still has an overemphasis on what I would call the "political aspects." It tends to emphasize the major political events in national and international affairs and to be a study of history in a formal and narrowly conceived sense. The idea of social studies as embracing all of society as a group of interrelated, interdependent persons with a variety of social and economic as well as political relationships has not been fully accepted in the private schools, though from limited observation I would say that more and more is being done with the study of economics.

The aforementioned amateur standing of private school teachers leads them to be suspicious of new methods of teaching. They do not have the problem of dealing with the non-reader or the reader of low ability to the extent which public schools do. Because of this, private schools are able to do most of their teaching on the basis of printed material amplified by a modification of the Socratic method in the classroom. When handled by an able, imaginative teacher this method is extremely effective. There is no evidence I know of which would indicate that it could not be supplemented and made even more effective through the judicious use of more group projects, visual aids, and direct learning through field trips.

That private school students chiefly come from families in the upper income brackets and that most of these schools are, in themselves, strongly conservative in atmosphere, are two factors which combine to make student opinion strongly right wing on most social and economic questions. I do not feel, however, that this viewpoint is reflected by the social studies teachers or in the social studies classes of private schools. If I were to make any generalization at all, I would say that the social studies teachers in a private school are, more often than not, to the left of their colleagues in other departments. This stems from better information and background on the questions of the day and a resulting unwillingness to reflect simply the opinions of the atmosphere in which they work. As far as I know private

schools have generally been tolerant toward mildly left wing and even collectivist opinions among their teachers. They seem to be aware of the need for individual freedom of opinion and the balanced presentation of differing views. They provide an atmosphere in which controversial issues of all kinds can be discussed without fear.

After this all too brief analysis of the nature of social studies work in private schools, let us turn to a characterization of public schools, and then attempt to see what consequences it has for the teaching of social studies. Although there are various specialized types of public secondary schools, such as the trade school and the classical high school which prepares only for college, there is certainly much less diversity than there is among private schools. The public secondary school is a four or six year institution which, depending on local policy, may include any grades between seven and fourteen.

In the past fifty years, the public secondary schools of the United States have undergone a revolution in the sense that they have had to change from serving a small segment of our population for a specialized purpose to serving all comers for a variety of purposes. Impelled by compulsory education laws—through the age of sixteen in many states—this revolution has demanded a tremendous adjustment on the part of our public schools. The adjustment has consisted of giving practical effect to the proposition that there is a type of high school education which can satisfy the needs of students of all backgrounds and of all levels of ability. Making the adjustment has forced public schools in most cases to become two or three schools in one, by offering different curriculums for different types of interest and ability. At the same time, public schools have faced the realization that they represented the terminal education of most of their students (about 20% of high school students now go on to further formal education) and the social implications which this fact carries with it.

Modern public school education is centered around the idea of education for life, rather than that of education for further education. Public school teachers are primarily the product of those teachers colleges and schools of education of which the private school teachers are suspicious. The most important characteristic of public schools is simply that they are public. That is, they derive the largest part of their funds from the communities in which they exist and set their policies to conform to the will of political bodies which are elected to represent the people of these communities. These political bodies may or may not have any interest in or knowledge of education, depending

on local political traditions and pressures. These traditions and pressures take the place in the formation of public school policy that the opinions of Alumni hold over the actions of the administrators of private schools. They are unofficial and not always admitted to exist, but they are often very powerful.

These few major characteristics of public schools will serve to point up some of the most significant elements found in their social studies programs. First, particularly when comparison is made with private schools, is the public school emphasis on the contemporary. Although history courses in which studies of the past are attempted with a view to seeing earlier times through the eyes of the people who then lived are found in public schools, the more normal pattern is to press analogies with the present and sometimes to press them too far. Public school social studies courses often give topical treatments of certain problems or broad issues which are pursued rapidly down through the years with the emphasis on the present status of the problem. This type of approach to social studies work has probably developed because of the feeling among public school teachers that their students were soon to become citizens and required formal instruction in current issues. The "Problems of Democracy" course found in the senior year of so many public high schools is evidence of this tendency. It is interesting to notice that the extended survey made in New York State a year or more ago resulted in recommendations which would at least approach more closely the type of work now being done in private schools as far as history courses are concerned.

In making meaningful studies of local community affairs, the work being done in public schools seems outstanding. Here, I believe, the private schools have something to learn. Even though the public school treatment is not often historical in nature so that students can obtain an idea of how their local institutions evolved, it frequently results in a genuine interest in local government and its problems. There are few public school systems which do not give formal and effective instruction in at least the forms of state and local government, and many of them do this by the direct method of showing the students the government in operation.

That the public schools assume an obligation to educate all comers through the 12th grade has meant that the teachers in these schools have been forced into a wide variety of teaching methods to satisfy the needs and abilities of their students whose I. Q.'s range from 80 to 140 and whose interests run from matrimony to the priesthood. Some of the experimentation which has gone into working out new and successful teaching methods

has been done in schools of education attached to large universities. Some of it has come from teachers colleges and some from original and thoughtful teachers who have used their classrooms as laboratories. The impact of the "science" of psychology on teaching techniques has provided still another source for evolving new methods. Although the general run of private school teachers remain uninformed about these developments, they are common knowledge in most public schools; and they have been used to particular advantage in working out methods to get across the concepts of social studies work to the group of students to whom it is impossible to say with any expectation of success: "Read pages 79-93 and be prepared to take a test on them." These methods have been found equally successful with the groups of higher ability.

In dealing with contemporary affairs, the public schools are doing a good job of giving balance to the social studies idea. That is, they do not overemphasize political developments at the expense of the study of economic factors and cultural concepts. An attempt has been made to carry this same balance into the study of the past in the courses in World History which are increasingly offered in public schools. These courses are centered around cultural rather than political concepts, but they are necessarily so broad and general that some teachers doubt their efficacy. "World History" courses do bring at least a nodding acquaintance with the cultures and problems of areas of the world such as Asia, Africa, and South America, which tend to be ignored in the private school treatment except insofar as they infringe on Western European development through colonial and economic rivalry among nations. One aspect of society which is much ignored in the public schools is religion. Separation of church and state is so interpreted as to restrict teaching on past religious issues—let alone current ones. The private schools do more with this, but generally on a sectarian basis. This leads indirectly to another special problem of public schools.

That public schools are controlled by political bodies elected by the public probably has its greatest significance for social studies teachers in their feeling of hesitancy about discussing any and all issues in the classroom. Even where protected by tenure laws, teachers hesitate to antagonize those in ultimate authority by expressing controversial opinions. In public schools the political position of school committeemen makes them ultra-sensitive to pressure from even a very small group or an individual. If this pressure takes the form of criticism of opinions expressed or factual material studied in a social studies class, the teacher is, at least, likely to hear about it. For this reason, in spite of

the wide concern over contemporary affairs in public schools, the social studies are to a certain extent emasculated. The recent appointment of an Ambassador to the Vatican is, for instance, an example of an item which some social studies teachers would hesitate to discuss fully in the public schools of many cities and towns on our eastern seaboard. With the increasing tendency to classify anyone whose views differ from those of Joe McCarthy as a "pink," there is bound to be a tightening up on the part of public school teachers of the limits of discussion within which they feel free to work. Because they are free from political connection, private schools are in a better position in this respect. This has certainly been proved true on the college level where there have been numerous instances of unwarranted interference by state political officials on the grounds of combating communism.

If these rather broad generalizations about public and private school social studies work prove anything at all, they prove that each party has something to gain from the other. There are a few channels for mutual give and take—among them the columns of this journal. But the channels of communication are as nothing compared to the barriers which exist between these two types of secondary schools. The place to overcome these barriers is, first of all, in the communities where the private schools exist. The method is by organized joint activities on a professional level which will tend to nullify any social distinctions which may have grown up. The fact that private and public schools have a different emphasis as far as basic purpose is concerned does not mean that people who work in the field of social studies in one have nothing to offer to those in the same field in the other. As I have tried to point out, there is some reason to believe that the strengths and weaknesses in social studies work of private and public schools are complementary. If this is the case, what better reason can there be to get together?

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Trends In Recent Textbooks In European History

Part II

An earlier article* on European history texts treated the revolution in the size, "furniture," and scope of some recent books. And it suggested that many of the newer works, ambitiously reflecting a very broad definition of history indeed, tended to include too much and therefore, paradoxically, too little. History texts increasingly reveal the current accent on the visual, on "one world" and other global conceptions, and on such ambiguities as "integration" and "comprehensiveness" and the stock phrases of the Education curriculum. This indictment (actually it is an observation that needs no special laboring) applies more specifically to the civilization texts which have appeared since the war to accomodate a curious impatience with a more thorough, detailed, and limited type of history.

One wonders how many "trends" and "forces" learned in sweep texts will be retained by the student and, if retained, to what extent they will contribute to a real understanding of the men and events that shaped history. Mr. Lacey Baldwin Smith of Princeton University, in a recent article on textbooks (*Journal of Modern History*, September 1951) sagely observes that "our concentration on vast, inexplicable, and pervading social and economic developments strips history and human action of all moral responsibility . . . Too often we find sentences and phrases which give the student the impression that some diabolical and inevitable force is contriving to destroy our civilization, that such social forces have a mind and an existence independent of the millions of individuals who create them." The emphasis on trends and forces has been partly the result of a need, material in essence, to cut books to something approaching portability. The passage of time has had, as this reviewer suggested in his first article, a real effect upon the over-all treatment of European history. This change has not been the result of a new perspective afforded by the momentous events of the past few years but rather has it sprung from the necessity of compressing and synthesizing in order to accomodate recent history. The trend toward a more general treatment of certain periods in European history should make the teacher alive to the need for source books

* Part I of this article appeared in March, 1951.

and other collateral devices designed to acquaint the student with the detailed raw material behind historical generalizations. First-hand knowledge of detail alone can chasten the generalizations which too often are the foundations of the doctrinaire approach to social and political problems which we deplore. The social usefulness of history emerges in part from its emphasis upon the specific details of man's story; the activities of man, a "free and tragic being" in Toynbee's phrase, must be released from the demonic devices and forces and trends which a sweep treatment of history makes so plausible.

Recent developments have happily brought forth admirable works designed to give the student an understanding of the process of historical change. One of these, *Select Problems in Historical Interpretation*, a product of the Yale Department of History, has taken a number of problems, edited the pertinent documents, and has asked a number of suggestive and searching questions. Thus the first volume of this work deals with the period 800 to 1715 and treats the Medieval Church, Canossa, the English monarchy under Edward I, the Renaissance in Italy, the Reformation, and many other topics. As the authors remind us in their preface, the problems are set to demonstrate to the undergraduate the principles upon which historical reasoning is based. Too often the texts, with a boldness never exhibited by the natural sciences, will describe Canossa as "the high water mark of medieval papalism" and hold back from the student, as if it were a trade secret, the ingredients that go into that statement. *Select Problems*, on the other hand, is a kind of laboratory manual which does more than any work this reviewer knows to introduce the student to the methods of the working historian. Its use should acquaint the student, as practice can, with the subtle interplay of ambitions and principles that give depth and meaning to concise generalization. Since it is the anatomy of a text, *Select Problems* can be the foundation of a mature course in general European history; and it should prove useful to the superior preparatory school student as well.

Another collateral work, more conventional in aim and construction, is Professor R. P. Stearns' *Pageant of Europe: Sources and Selections from the Renaissance to the Present Day*, published in 1947 and closely tied to Professor Schevill's *History of Europe*. It is more comprehensive in its selection than the older Robinson *Readings;* indeed it provides an example of a trend discussed in this reviewer's first article: Stearns offers in portable form documents and selections from modern historians which dispose of the need for extra copies of numerous books. Thus, to take some of the excerpts at random, there are collected

in Stearns chapters from Creighton's *Age of Elizabeth*, Birdsall's *Versailles Twenty Years After*, Guerard's *French Civilization in the Nineteenth Century*, and relevant passages from scores of works which often lie untouched on library shelves because the limited number of copies does not warrant their being included on a required reading syllabus. Stearns' work also includes the standard documentary material which appeared in the older handbooks: Luther's Ninety-five Theses, the Toleration Act, Wilson's Fourteen Points, and others. Taken with Schevill's text, the *Pageant of Europe* allows the elementary course to expand when the textbook compresses. Scott, Hyma, Noyes, *Readings in Medieval History* provides a collection of important chapters from the works of Rostovtzeff, Dill, Funck-Brentano, and Ralph Adams Cram, among others, and thereby introduces to the student a wide array of authors to temper and moderate the text.

Although there is nothing new in the anthology-type work described above, its application to historical literature, outside the field of documents, is a noteworthy development and one which will doubtless become more pronounced as the strain on college and school library facilities increases. There will be less excuse, in consequence, for textbooks alone becoming substitutes for other books; the teacher will be less at the mercy of those who in effect organize his course for him by inflicting on him, through the text, their conception of the important themes in European history.

The problem of the themes that receive special emphasis in contemporary works is perforce a more difficult one than the problem already treated in these articles. The first noticeable change in theme has already been described as springing from the fact that texts tend to take on the obligation of the syllabus and include more material on art, music, literature, and science. A second perceptible development is suggested by a fresh chronological arrangement of two-volume works. Although many works on modern history, among them Schevill, take the fifteenth century as the start of their narratives, some, including Ferguson and Bruun, begin in 1660 and suggest, thereby, that the second semester of the survey course treat the last two and one half centuries in more detail. A perusal of the works that observe the new chronological partitions, on the other hand, curiously fails to show that the material on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is more complete for the change. On the contrary, half of Professor F. C. Palm's *Western Civilization*, to take one that is typical, is devoted to the world since 1914, and the preceding period, the seed time of modern bourgeois society, is compressed into 368 pages. Actually, the sections in texts on very recent

history are rarely used in elementary courses. If the teacher is able to reach the second world war as early June approaches, he has access to other sources for assignments. Often pamphlet and periodical literature is more useful than the second part of his text book. Most teachers probably find it impossible, because of their conventional and sound concentration on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to find much use, when the time comes, for half the text. Most of their course, as a result, depends upon a text which gives a capsule treatment to material that deserves unfolding into greater detail.

There is a more serious intellectual indictment that can be levelled at the compressed book with its poorly assimilated appendage on recent events. In the long run, a general treatment of the period from 1660 to 1914 leaves the student unprepared for the events which suddenly assail him after 1918. A lengthy section on Soviet between the wars and a longer one on the Soviet since 1945 demands at least two lengthy chapters on earlier Russian history if the student is to regard the Russian Revolution as something more than a diabolical movement conjured up in 1917. Mussolini and Franco receive detailed and often badly digested treatment in a number of recent works. But the background of these movements receives conventional or sketchy treatment. Most writers feel that their obligation to record Spanish history in the nineteenth century is paid off by a paragraph on the Carlist movement. And there has been no perceptible rearrangement of the older material on Mazzini, Cavour, and Garibaldi to prepare the student for the reception of the man who was desperately Italian and who believed in the function of Latinity. The advent of British socialism, the shift of the center of diplomatic gravity to the United States, and scores of themes contained in the additional chapters at the end of history texts, have not yet suggested any significant structural changes in earlier chapters that could serve as intellectual preparation.

Despite the importance of the experience of some of the smaller states of Europe in the economic and social spheres, particularly the Scandinavian countries, these areas receive only casual and spotty treatment in most works. Although one could not seriously urge a detailed treatment of the internal history of Albania or Portugal in the nineteenth century, one can urge that textbook authors abandon the idea that only the big states are fit subjects of historical analysis. This plea seems particularly important in the light of the emergence in Sweden, for example, of a type of social and economic organization which has been proposed as a "middle way." Nevertheless, a fat work on Europe since 1815

by Hall and Davis, a book whose size and restricted period would certainly lead one to anticipate some treatment of Scandinavia, devotes one paragraph to Sweden in the nineteenth century (specifically the translation of Marshal Bernadotte into Charles XIV) and three references thereafter. In the same work of one thousand pages, Leopold II of the Belgians is mentioned once in a section devoted to European imperialism in Africa. The complexity of European civilization demands that the parts, however small, be assessed by reference to canons other than those springing from diplomatic and military success or failure. The virtual abandonment of Scandinavia after Charles XII by American writers leaves the American student ill prepared indeed when he is suddenly confronted by the literary, artistic, and social accomplishments of that area in modern times.

A standard criticism of texts touches their failure, particularly in those areas which come within the particular scholarly competence of the teacher, to incorporate new material, revisions, and additions turned up in recent monographs. Since the "new revised edition" is more often than not a factual continuation to include the latest problems of the United Nations, the appearance of a standard work in a new cover is no guarantee that new material has been incorporated in the narrative. Indeed, herein lies a constant intellectual challenge to the teacher and an opportunity for his virtuosity.

More serious, perhaps, is the continued neglect by textbook authors of fields which have long ceased to fall into the category of *recherché* learning. Byzantium, to take one case in point, is unfortunately overlooked or relegated to a single chapter in most texts dealing with the middle ages. Gibbon's impatient treatment of the East has left its indelible mark on most general texts. Professor LaMonte's *The World of the Middle Ages*, a work unfortunately too advanced for most elementary courses, is one of the few that places the Eastern Empire in its proper perspective and therefore brings the West into proper focus as well.

Administrative history, a body of material which can shed light on problems traditionally treated as constitutional and political questions, has not penetrated the textbook. And there does not appear to be sufficient scholarly uncertainty and humility about the whole problem of the Renaissance.

Uncertainty and humility about most of the great historical questions would perhaps be the best frame of mind in which to begin the composition of a new textbook. That approach is doubtless the only one which can produce a book free of the platitudes and conventions of most works.

Every teacher should have in his mind a plan for the ideal

textbook. It need not, and indeed probably it never will, be written and published. But it should become his course. Our preoccupation with texts and our vexations when we cannot find the best ones should not obscure the fact that the course, a creation of the teacher himself, must be our most important concern.

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Singapore

A PROBLEM IN EMPIRE DEFENSE *

(1)

Ten o'clock on Sunday evening, the fifteenth of February, 1942, at the Ford Factory on Singapore Island, Lt. General A. E. Percival, commanding British forces, surrendered to Lt. General Tomyuki Yamashita, commander of the invading Japanese army. Fifty-two thousand square miles, the whole of Malaya, was in enemy hands after a campaign lasting nine weeks. Seven days after the first midnight landings on Singapore the only first-class, adequately equipped allied base between Malta and Pearl Harbor had capitulated to the Japanese.

The loss of Singapore was something more than a loss of some 60,000 men and untold equipment. None could measure the loss in moral prestige which in great part was the vital element binding the British Empire together. None would undertake to answer the question of the willingness of former British subjects to resume allegiance to the Crown when the war would at last come to an end.

Many things made the capitulation of Singapore inevitable. The most important, and undoubtedly sufficient unto itself, was that Britain's chief interest, eighteen months after Dunkirk, lay in the defeat of Germany.[1] This accounted for the inadequate numbers of men and the inadequate modern equipment at Singapore. (Not a single tank fought in the Malayan campaign.) This same interest helped to account for the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* on 11 December 1941. The sinking cost the British control of the seas, which by itself, had there been no European war, might have lost the base. In any event, the remaining fleet units stationed at Singapore were now withdrawn.

Other factors assisted the Japanese in their fight for Singapore. A mistaken concept of strategic defense had assumed attack could come only from the sea, and fixed defense positions were

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* The most recent book on the subject, published in January, is *Main Fleet To Singapore* by Russell Grenfell (The Macmillan Co.)

[1] One of the arguments against constructing a naval base at Singapore had been that an Asiatic war would probably occur only in conjunction with a war in Europe in which event the base would be untenable.

therefore strongest on the eastern and southern coasts. But the Japanese took Singapore by land from the north.[2] It has been suggested that the possible defection of the troops at Singapore, and the incompetence of their commanders, contributed to the rapid surrender of the base, as did the possible lack of co-operation between the various racial groups living on the island in taking defense precautions.

Whatever the reasons, Singapore fell. Time alone could tell how serious the loss had been. Yet it was clear that Great Britain's policy of defense in the Far East, as conceived over a period of twenty years, had been proved ineffective and was at an end.

(2)

For Singapore had been the key to the defense of the richest part of Britain's colonial Empire. It was the center of an area inhabited by some twenty million people who looked to England for their security. In failing them England had failed in her responsibility to the concept of Empire itself.

A naval base had first been established at Singapore in 1882. The new "overseas" base was opened, with the completion of the King George VI graving dock, on 14 February 1938, at a cost estimated up to £60,000,000 when Singapore fell in 1942. Actual statistics of troop compliment and weapon emplacement were not available to the public. The new base covered approximately forty-five square miles, much of it reclaimed mangrove swamp; the naval section covered about four square miles, fronting on an anchorage of roughly twenty square miles of deep water. The quays, three miles east of the causeway connecting the island to the mainland of Johore, were 5,000 feet long, with thirty to forty feet alongside at low water. The graving dock, 1,000 feet long and 80 feet in depth, had a 130 foot beam. The new floating dock, 855 feet in length with a 178 foot beam, displaced 50,000 tons, and was thus capable of taking the largest modern capital ship. There was a new 500 ton crane. There were all the necessary shore facilities for repairing and servicing a modern fleet. There were fire-proof oil storage tanks and underground munitions dumps. Shore batteries were installed, and at Changi, on the eastern tip of the island, the heavy coastal defense guns, thought to be at least 16 inches, were particularly

[2] They were aided in doing so by Vichy France's capitulation in Indo-China in March, 1941, and the "surrender" of Thailand in the following December. British policy had always contemplated a friendly power in Indo-China.

numerous. In 1939 18,000 troops of all ranks were stationed on the island. By 1941 there were four serviceable operational strips, as well as a new fleet air arm base, and a regular garrison of four RAF squadrons. September of that year saw a new torpedo depot under construction. Such a fine base was Singapore, by 1941, that many believed even if the United States did not enter a war in which England fought Japan, and even with previous British commitments, it would be vastly difficult to take the island.

In 1936 the English fleet in Asiatic waters consisted of eight cruisers, one carrier, nine destroyers, fifteen submarines, besides a number of auxiliaries. This small fleet was in keeping with the policy which maintained just enough ships available at all times to engage the enemy and hold him off until the main fleet arrived, a twelve day cruise from the Mediterranean.

(3)

Singapore, which had become a British possession in 1819, in times of peace was a focal point in shipping from east to west. There the trade lines of the Pacific drew together, passing on to the Indian Ocean and to the rest of the British Empire. Before World War II fifty steamship lines regularly used this free port. The shipping of the world was to be seen tied alongside its three miles of docks. By 1930 as much commerce flowed by this international *entrepôt* as went through the Panama or Suez canals.

When eventually it was determined to build a new Pacific base Singapore was chosen as the site.[2] Few places in the world fulfilled so strikingly the requirements of a strategic base. Of all British possessions in the Pacific area Singapore best met the three major demands of any naval base: security, position, and resources.

The island was small, some 220 miles square, and one, it was believed, which, properly equipped, could defend itself in the absence of a large fleet for the length of time needed to move that fleet. Situated at the southern end of the Straits of Malacca, which stretch to the west for 200 miles at an average width of 25 miles, numerous small islands suitable for mining, submarine, and air operations simplified defense from the east. Unlike Hongkong, Singapore had no land interior to defend: to the north mountainous Malaya, about seventy percent some of the most impenetrable jungle in the world, presented a difficult and, it was thought, an impossible approach.

[2] Sydney was Singapore's nearest rival. But Hongkong (1454 miles from Singapore) and Calcutta, the Empire's second largest city (1646 miles), would have been hard to defend from Sydney.

No modern arsenals were in easy reach which would be able to supply a landing force on Malaya. Ships alone, and they would be easy targets, would be able to supply such a force. Air attack on Malaya and Singapore would be relatively impotent: landbased planes would be obliged to fly long distances, and would thus have to carry light bomb loads; shipborne planes would home on highly vulnerable bases. Singapore seemed easily defensible, from all sides, from all known weapons.

World War I had taught that first in the defense of the Empire, even above its political integrity, was the defense of trade routes. Trade formed the background to British naval strategy, and broadly speaking, naval policy consisted in the defense of imperial sea communications. With 80,000 miles of trade routes, which by 1938 daily poured 50,000 tons of food and 110,000 tons of other merchandise into the homeland, valued at about £17,500,000, England had overseas investments estimated in the same year at £3,700,000,000. Daily 1,500 British ships over 3,000 tons were at sea.

Singapore formed as much of a trade boundary as Suez. As at Gibraltar and Aden, trade lines were forced into narrow channels—and lines of communication can be secured only at such narrow channels. Clearly Singapore, at the geographical center of the Empire, formed the critical defile on the lower end of the Pacific-Indian-Mediterranean trade route, which was second in importance only to the Northern route in the survival of Great Britain. The unity and interdependence and the power of the Empire depended upon the Navy which had a dual task of protecting the insular center, and maintaining the lines of commerce without which the center could not exist.

As long as a fleet was available and as long as it was supplied, Singapore would assist the Navy in performing its task of defending the lines of trade. Along this route it would be the last link in the chain. For the only approaches to the Indian Ocean were through the British controlled Suez from the Atlantic, or the Straits of Malacca from the Pacific. Fleets might steam from the Atlantic around the Cape of Good Hope or from the Pacific around Australia: not only would they be passing through areas of British influence on the way, but their potential striking power after such a long voyage would be almost negligible.

Singapore flanked the approach of China and Japan to the South, thus protecting Australia and New Zealand from possible attacks from these sources. About Singapore lay two-thirds of the territory and four-fifths of the population of the Empire. Only a fleet based within the area would have the mobility sufficient to defend such interests. Great Britain rightly felt it her

duty to provide some sort of protection for Australia and New Zealand, for India, for her trade, and for her large investments in China and Hongkong.

Clearly there was reason for protection and clearly Singapore was the place most suited to afford protection.[4] When the final argument about the base came it was neither over the desirability of Singapore as the place to put it, nor over the need for protection, but rather over the means whereby protection was to be secured and the amount of protection necessary to provide.

(4)

A naval base at Singapore would not be close enough to Japanese or American bases to present a serious threat to them. The nearest Japanese station of any consequence, Sasebo, was 2,428 miles distant; Yokohama, the base of the First Fleet, lay 2,889 miles away. Japan clearly fell outside the 1,500 mile perimeter of attack: against Japan Singapore would be useful only for purposes of defense. Manila, 1,330 miles away, and the nearest American base, was within the same radius as Hongkong, on the outer limit of the attack perimeter.

Yet Japan alone objected to the construction of a strong new base at Singapore. American and British interests in the Pacific presented few points of disagreement and in any event were sufficiently close elsewhere to obviate any chances of war between the two countries.[5] On the other hand, the interests of both countries possessed points where they might clash with Japan: Japan conceived that if Singapore was being directed against anyone it was being directed against her.

As it developed in the course of time, the basic drive in Japan had been toward modern nationhood. The aim, and the demands entailed by it, became high-lighted in the 1920s and 1930s. The geographical background to Japan's problem lay in her position as a group of weak islands, surrounded by China and Russia, and strong British and American interests.

Specifically, Japan had the problems arising from pressure of population and poverty of natural resources, heightened by anti-Japanese immigration and tariff regulations. Her popula-

[4] Other factors outweighed the arguments that Singapore's resources were limited and it was a difficult place to supply.

[5] British opinion throughout this period thought, in a word, that it would be the heighth of foolishness to consider any warlike preparations against the United States, offensive or defensive.

tion grew at a rate of from 700,000 to nearly 1,000,000 a year at the end of this period. Obviously these people had to go somewhere, unless Japan was to cut her standard of living drastically. But this was low enough already and to have altered it might have meant ruin for the rising military caste which sought to dominate the country. Incapable of supporting the growing population, Japan's ancient economy was equally incapable of meeting the needs of a modern nation, with a rising standard of living, which in turn increased the population. To be a modern nation Japan needed things like iron.[6] To obtain iron she had to be imperialistic. To be imperialistic she had to obtain iron. The circle was viscious.

There were many points at which Japanese and American interests conflicted. First among these, perhaps, was the Philippines, which presented an economic outlet for Japan as well as one for her population. Only sixteen percent of Japanese land was arable and even should Japan secure her foothold in China her excess population could not migrate there.

At the basis of Japanese policy was the attempt to acquire the Chinese market. This presented a second area of conflict, for not only did the United States feel diplomatically bound to uphold the Open Door in China,[7] but her volume of Chinese trade was growing until by 1933 it was twice as large as Japan's. American tariff policy curtailed economic development in Japan. Finally, Japan's prestige was hard hit by the American attitude towards immigration, which culminated in the Immigration Act of 1924, abbrogating the "Gentlemen's Agreement."

Yet in the long run it appeared that Great Britain would present the most serious obstacle to Japanese growing pains. England's investments in China were far larger than those of the United States and her volume of trade was still considerable. While England knew that the Philippines would be the first on any list for Japanese expansion, Australia was inviting. The "White Australia" policy only aggravated the fact that Australia's density was 1.8 persons to the square mile, while Japan's was 376. (In 1936 there were only 102 Japanese in New Zealand.)

Facing both the United States and Great Britain was Japan's developing sense of mission, her nationalism, her growing militarism. Japan had fought five wars since 1874.

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[6] There was a 50% increase in Japanese manufacturing industry between 1931 and 1936. By 1938 heavy industry production was 61% of Japan's total.

[7] How far in fact the United States would have gone to uphold the Open Door is another matter.

The final decision to rebuild the base at Singapore was the result of the repudiation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 13 July 1911. In turn this had been the result of the conditions insisted upon by the United States, backed by Canada, in the Four Power Pact of 13 December 1921, and of the naval limitations imposed by the Washington Conference of 1921-22 ending the security which the Alliance had afforded.

As early as 1919 the United States had been trying to arrange for a naval conference and had unofficially objected to the Alliance. English and Japanese *pourparlers* over its renewal had seemed to go far in meeting possible American objections. In any event, by the first of June, 1921 England knew that the United States favored a conference on naval matters and an end to the Anglo-Japanese agreement.[8]

In effect the Washington Conference internationalized the safeguarding of British Far Eastern interests. Of all the powers Great Britain had most to defend, yet she was left without an alliance, without bases, without sufficient ships. Why did she adhere to the Conference?

The Imperial Conference of 20 June 1921 had vigorously urged the renewal of the Alliance unless an adequate substitute could be found. Prime Minister Meighen of Canada alone objected. He reflected American opinion which opposed renewal on the grounds that it allowed the Japanese a free hand at aggression in the Far East, thus endangering Anglo-American relations. Of course it was to Canada's interest to maintain the best of relations between the two countries. Some English opinion also believed that the Alliance formed an effective political shield for Japanese aggression and protected Japan's growing trade to the detriment of England's own trade. There were Americans who believed that, in the event of a war between the United States and Japan, Great Britain, because of the Alliance, would side against the United States.[9] Meighen was able to persuade the Conference to shelve a renewal of the Alliance and, instead, to attend a meeting on the subject of international con-

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[8] Although perhaps some Japanese feeling also favored the end of the Alliance, the evidence this feeling was at all widespread seems weak. See, among others, Ichihashi, Y.: *The Washington Conference and After*, (Stanford Univ. Press, 1928) p. 120.

[9] A. W. Griswold, (*The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*, N. Y., 1938) p. 274, alone seems to interpret the Alliance as binding England to fight with Japan against the United States in the event of a war between the two countries. He states, however, that American distrust arose not over the possibility of war, but over her own general relations with Japan.

trol in the Pacific which the United States had already suggested. Before the close of the Imperial Conference the plans for a base at Singapore were approved and Australia's suggestion for the creation of a Far Eastern Fleet considered.

After the World War, and with the disappearance of the German Fleet, Britain understood that she could no longer consider herself the mistress of the seas. The growth of the American and Japanese navies had shifted the center of sea power to the Pacific—as indicated in August, 1919, when the United States sent the superior half of her Navy through the Panama Canal to form the basis of the new Pacific Fleet. By 1921 the United States and Japan were at the beginning of a first-class naval race. In the past two years the United States had laid down sixteen capital ships, and the Japanese had retaliated in 1920 with their "Double Eight" program. Japan's growing strength formed the factor upsetting the Pacific balance of power. England's Far Eastern policy after 1919 was to maintain the stability of the Pacific—clearly this new naval race would not secure that balance. Chiefly for this reason Great Britain submitted to the Washington Conference.

There were other reasons. While England realized that the United States in accepting the treaty was scrapping more than she scrapped, she understood the more important fact that in any naval race with the United States she would not come out the winner, certainly for the time being. England realized that a segment of American opinion, particularly among trading elements, would be quite willing to undertake such a race and see it to the finish. Furthermore, the cultural ties between the two countries could not be disregarded. In the long run England believed the good will of the United States more desirable than that of the new piece in the Pacific scene, Japan.

The United States did not lack her own problems. Japan's double-eight program was probably the determining factor in the calling of the Conference. Americans, knowing the United States could win a naval race with either England or Japan, could not be certain once started where such a race would end. They could not be certain that it would not serve only to tighten the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in which case the United States would be building against both countries. American public opinion generally favored disarmament and wholly opposed the high taxes which a race would necessitate.

The strategic position of the United States in the Pacific demanded immediate consideration. It was not a happy one. The strategic problem presented by the Philippines was at this time almost insoluble. The 4,767 miles from Pearl Harbor to Manila

was a long route to cover: if the United States fortified Guam, 1,499 miles from Manila, or other islands, Japan would be sure to retaliate by fortifying her own islands. The agreements arrived at in Washington were an attempted diplomatic solution to a strategic enigma in which the United States had involved herself, but which American opinion would not have supported to the extent of war.

Japan first met the Washington Conference with some disapproval. It appeared, quite obviously, to be designed against her. Yet Japan soon began to realize that, should she not subscribe to its terms, the shipbuilding program on which she would then have to embark would be almost ruinous. Japan sacrificed her double-eight program quickly and without regret: she did not have the money to pay for it; she did not have the steel with which to build the ships.

England made the choice of siding with the United States: ". . . the first principle of our foreign policy is co-operation with the United States. We are all convinced that upon this, more than upon any other single factor, depends the peace and well-being of the world."[10] Once England sided with Japan, Japan would have the Philippines. And once Japan had the Philippines . . . . The fundamental difficulty for England, of course, was that a balance of power did not permit friendship with both Japan and the United States at once.

Japan in point of fact lost little by signing the agreements. By a diplomatic victory she gained the position for which she had struggled for fifty years. The treaties kept the other powers out of the areas in which she wished to operate. Attempting to reconcile conflicting interests and concepts of national security in order to preserve world peace, they left Japan invulnerable to sea attack. For her present purposes her regional navy was equal to those of the two leading powers. The United States had succeeded in protecting herself, but she had granted supremacy to Japan in China.

Designed to prohibit aggressive warfare in the Pacific, if the Washington Conference kept the peace for a while it in turn prepared the way for war in the 1940s. "The treaties went as far as pen and ink could go to preserve a peace founded on such antithetical elements as those inherent in the *status quo* in the Far East."[11] In adhering to the base limites imposed, both Great Britain and the United States ruled out offensive war

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[10] Lloyd George, in reference to the Imperial Conference, London *Times* 12, July 1921.

[11] Griswold, *Far Eastern Policy*, p. 331.

against Japan, and Japan was possibly even more aware of this than they were. The Conference pointed out that Japan would have a free hand to act in China without requiring a large fleet, with its attendant expenses, until her aims in China had been secured. How far this freedom engendered a confused set of values in Japanese military minds cannot be measured. Certain it is that the Washington Conference permitted the unhampered development of Japan's Asian policies until it was too late to stop them short of war. It is suggested as self-evident that had there been no Conference the Pacific War would have been fought under entirely different circumstances. It is suggested that insofar as it was the direct result of this Conference the construction of a new base at Singapore was grounded on false assumptions.

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Article 19 of the Treaty Limiting Naval Armaments prohibited Great Britain from constructing new bases east of 110 degrees east longitude, except in waters adjacent to the Dominions, until 31 December 1936. The Admiralty held that the Navy could not be expected to protect British Dominions and trade, and thus the center of Empire, unless it were possible to operate modern ships of war in Far Eastern waters. Only adequate docking facilities would make such operation possible.

In 1922 adequate docking facilities did not exist. Under the Washington agreement it was not permissible to rebuild the outmoded facilities already existing at Hongkong.[12] Singapore, in accordance with Admiralty recommendations approved by the Dominions, was selected as the site for the new base. British naval power would be projected 6,000 miles east of Malta.

Nearly fifteen years of passionate debate on the usefulness and desirability of the base preceeded its opening in 1938.[13] Opinion in England on this question in general divided on party lines, Conservative opinion supporting, Liberal and Labor opinion opposing construction. One of the chief objections was that the

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[12] Hongkong was dropped with few misgivings, as insecure from land attack out of China, and easily accessible from sea and air attack.

[13] Construction at Singapore contributed to suspicion in the Pacific. Under any circumstances there would have been new building at the base; yet had there been no Washington Conference the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would have been retained, and construction would have been minor and would have appeared as a perfectly normal refurnishing of facilities. Lady Astor was quite right in saying that it was a "disservice" to refer to Singapore as a menace so frequently because it put ideas into people's heads. (Commons Debates, 19 March 1925, p. 2631.) The fifteen-year debate added much fuel to whatever fire the Japanese were tending.

money to be spent on the base was urgently needed at home for education, housing, and other welfare developments. Another held that the original estimates of £10,000,000, which did not include air or military defenses, would not nearly cover the actual cost. Many believed that since Singapore was to be an Imperial base the Dominions should pay for it, at least in large part. It was further argued that Home Defense should be developed first; that if too much money were spent on bases none would be left for ships; that there were not enough airplanes for home defense, much less enough to spare those which Singapore would require. If the base were not completed for ten years might it not be outmoded before it could be used, and the money thus spent be so much money thrown away? Might not even wider bulges appear on battleships and make new docks necessary? Was it not true that battleships were no longer useful? If the purpose of the base was solely defense, would not a cruiser base be adequate?

The most serious objection, however, was that construction of a strong station at Singapore comprised a dangerous stroke of diplomacy. England had signed the League Covenant, the Locarno Pact, the Kellogg Pact. How did this seeming advocacy of a system of collective security harmonize with an attempt to seek individual security through the building of a large naval operating base?[14]

Many believed other nations would not be happy to see England become a self-appointed policeman. What was to stop the Japanese, or even the Dutch, from entering a race to build bases?[15] If Japan were dangerous, new construction would only provoke her and make her more so. Far from being a deterrent to war a new base would be only an incentive.[16]

While the plan to build at Singapore did not violate the terms of the Washington Treaty, it did, many believed, violate its spirit. Singapore was only 350 miles west of the treaty line. But this opinion (of Labor) did not want to quibble about "exact geographical limits . . . What matters is not so much the detailed provisions of the new treaty as the new outlook and new policy of which it is the expression."[17] Ramsay MacDonald voiced the belief of a large segment of his party when he said that if things were only left alone in the Pacific eventually everything would

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[14] e. g. Commons Debates, 19 March 1929, pp. 1692-3.

[15] The Netherlands never objected to Singapore.

[16] See Commons Debates, 5th series; The London *Times; Brassey's Navy and Shipping Annual.*

[17] *Nation and Athenaeum*, London, 1923, v. 33, p. 186.

turn out to everyone's satisfaction.[18] This was, perhaps, somewhat unrealistic.

Proponents of the plan argued that it was neither extravagent, nor dangerous diplomacy. A base, they said, 3,000 miles away, could not be used in offensive operations against Japan, any more than Japan, 3,000 miles away, could be considered a threat to Singapore. To say that Singapore threatened Yokohama was the same as saying that Plymouth threatened New York or that Gibraltar threatened Boston. The question was not one of blockading Japan, but of protecting Australia and New Zealand. Balfour asked "how could any human being think Singapore was a menace to Japan and at the same time not think Japan was a menace to Australia?"[19]

Far from violating the spirit of the Washington Treaty, Singapore had been understood at Washington to have been left out of the discussion deliberately in order that England might build there.[20] While the League and similar undertakings were fine things and great gestures they had yet to be proved workable and able to guarantee tangible security. Until they did, preparation remained the best defense: in the longer run it was cheaper than war. Conservatives also pointed out that a small fleet operating in home waters has an advantage over a large fleet far from home without adequate bases—superiority in ships is not sufficient. The cost of servicing mounted rapidly when, for example, a ship had to steam 12,000 miles to and from Malta each time it needed its bottom scraped.[21] Fleet mobility would

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[18] Commons Debates, 23 March 1925, p. 82. Labor opinion was frequently too generous about Japan's good intentions. That Japan would automatically do the "nice" thing was at least debatable.

[19] London *Times*, 2 July 1925. Why, if Singapore were in fact such a menace, did not France and Holland object? On the other hand, opponents asked, if Japan were outside the effective radius of attack from Singapore, how could Japan be considered a menace to Australia, where even longer distances were involved. Singapore did not dominate the Pacific by any means and if Australia wished protection a base should be built at Sydney. Supporters of the plan pointed out that anyway an effective fighting radius drawn from Singapore covered a good deal more British than Japanese territory. (Commons Debates, 23 March 1925, pp. 102, 158)

[20] The United States did not seem to think a base at Singapore violated the Treaty and Japan knew of the plans at Washington. (London *Times*, 18 and 31 July, 1923). Prime Minister Bruce of Australia said that Australia would not have concurred in the Treaty unless it had known in advance that Singapore was exempted. (*Ibid*, 16 January, 1924; *Singapore Naval Base*, Cmd 2083, London, 1924)

[21] Ships in tropical waters need frequent scraping. As one person put it: "Hon. members who possess a Rolls-Royce do not let it stand in the rain. They build a garage to put it in. We are building a garage at Singapore." (Commons Debates, 23 March 1925, p. 153)

be vastly increased. Fleet mobility would mean lower marine insurance rates, with adequate protection in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. England's tea, rubber, wool, tin, oil, and frozen meat which came from these areas would be more likely to arrive.

Finally, the strength of the British Empire, with the Navy as the second 'golden link' after the Crown, had always in itself been a force for the preservation of world peace. The Empire without a Navy was shorn of its strength: a Navy without bases was no Navy. To build a base at Singapore was simply to buy "Empire Insurance."

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Note: Part II of this article will appear in the next issue.

Book Review

Marchette Chute, *An Introduction to Shakespeare* (E.P. Dutton & Co., 1951)

Marchette Chute's publishers proclaim on the jacket that no writer but Shakespeare "has given pleasure to more people, and this book shows why." This is, of course, to misrepresent the nature of Miss Chute's *An Introduction to Shakespeare.* The book is obviously designed for the younger reader, and there is perhaps no reason to expect any critical evaluation beyond that of the most conventional sort. As a way of understanding Shakespeare's meaning or art, the volume must seem —even to the younger reader—uncompromisingly vague. To know that Shakespeare was a "lord of language" does not broaden the critical sensibilities of even the inexperienced reader. Nor can anyone, of whatever age, be enlightened by the knowledge that *King Lear* has for its subject "old age and poverty and insanity" and that it creates a "broken and agonized world," the whole "exalted" by Shakespeare's poetry.

But criticism of this kind is alien and perhaps unfair to Miss Chute's implicit purpose: to write a brief study of Shakespeare as actor-manager, rather than of Shakespeare as artist. The emphasis is primarily on the problems of the Elizabethan stage—the character of the acting companies, the construction of the theaters, the use of scenery and costumes. As such there is much of value in the book, and although it will give the young reader no clear conception of Shakespeare's plays, it will at least show him, vividly and concisely, the atmosphere in which they were composed and the vitality of the days when the Globe was a busy, working theater.

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The Course of Europe Since Waterloo, Walter P. Hall and William S. Davis, pp. xviii, 1083. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 3rd ed., 1951. $5.50.

World Wars and Revolutions: The Course of Europe Since 1900, Walter P. Hall. pp. xiii, 531. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 3rd ed., 1952, $4.50.

The first book is the amended edition of a work last printed in 1947. Additions and corrections have been made in the text,

eleven new maps are included, and the bibliographies now list the most important new publications.

The problem of weighing the relative importance of events is recognized, although perhaps too much space (roughly 200 pages) is devoted to the years after 1939. That only six of the forty-two maps are concerned with situations previous to 1914 indicates some lack of balance. Similarly, twenty-seven of the forty-eight illustrations depict persons and events of importance in only the last twenty years of a 135 year period.

The second book is, with some changes, the last half of the first. One is again impressed by the extensive "Reading List," and is again reminded of how many of the books on it are unproven.

Criticisms of this sort are not intended to detract from the worth of the text, but to raise the question of where the work of the historian ends, and the work of the learned radio-commentator (part political scientist, economist, sociologist, and wishful-thinker) begins. For whom are the books designed, especially the latter? Not for the general reading public, and presumably not for college undergraduates—or, if so, would not more ample references be desirable—and, it is hoped, not for the high school student. The college undergraduate has far too many texts which make the stuff of "gut" courses, and which require him neither to think, nor to perform solid work. The high school student is exposed to far too many "contemporary history" courses, which will constitute his only study in history: whether this is a pity, is, of course, a matter of individual judgement. Better leave to the magazines, the newspapers, and the daily experiences of the student, the events of recent years, and let the history courses deal with the events of centuries. The citizen whom our schools and universities produce must understand both, but do not let him in his history courses speculate, for example, on the prospects of World War III.

Notes

The Joint Meeting of the New England Association of Social Studies Teachers with the New England Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools was held at Boston University early in December. The theme of the meeting was "Great Issues in Citizenship." Howard R. Anderson, of the United States Office of Education, and Professor Arthur E. Jensen of Dartmouth College addressed the general session. The college session discussed "The Great Issue Course at Dartmouth," and the

schools session considered "Life Adjustment Education and the Social Studies."

The National Council for the Social Studies has prepared a preliminary report concerned with the facts and problems of local social studies publications. It should be of particular interest to those who are seeking information on social studies outside of New England.

The United Nations Education Service (1201 16th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.) is prepared to assist schools which wish to teach international understanding.

"Labor and Industry in Britain," published by the British Information Services, is an excellent source for details on England's present economic condition, and on the conditions and solutions which much of the world may face in the future.

New England social studies teachers might find much of profit in the quarterly "Citizenship Journal," published by the New York State Council for the Social Studies.

UNDERSTANDING OUR FREE ECONOMY

FAIRCHILD, SHELLY

Written by a famous economist and college professor in collaboration with a social studies teacher at a well known eastern high school, this forthcoming elementary economics textbook is what high school economics teachers have been looking for.

It presents basic principles and important facts so clearly that high school students cannot fail to acquire a sound knowledge of economics. The style is simple and uncluttered; the vocabulary easy, with technical terms precisely defined in italics as they occur and also included in the glossary. Extensive use is made of illustrations to clarify the discussion; and questions at chapter-ends are designed not only to test the student's comprehension of the subject matter but also to determine his ability to apply the principles he has learned. But perhaps the book's most significant contribution is the constant integration of basic economic principles with the practical facts of the student's everyday life. The study of economics therefore becomes a matter of vital and pedsonal interest rather than an explanation of abstract and frequently uninteresting principles and statistics.

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